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THE LOCKERBIE CONTROVERSY: 
TENSION BETWEEN THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE AND THE SECURITY 
COUNCIL 
ERIC ZUBEL* 
Pan American Flight 103 exploded midair over Lockerbie, 
Scotland on December 21,1988. Investigations suggested that 
two Libyan nationals were to blame. When the U.N. Security 
Council imposed sanctions on the Libyan government in 1993 
for its failure to cooperate with U.S. and U.K extradition 
requests, Libya turned to the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) for help. Libya asked the ICJ to declare that Libya was 
not obliged to extradite its nationals to the United States or the 
United Kingdom and further asked the Court to enjoin the U.S. 
and the U.K from the use of force or threats against Libya. In 
1998, the ICJ found it had jurisdiction to hear the case, which 
put two bodies of the United Nations on a collision course. The 
author explores how the U.N. system handles its internal 
tensions, and compares the international system with U.S. 
federalism and civil rights. How far can judicial review reach 
in the global system? 
* Eric Zubel, A.B., University of Michigan; J.D., LL.M. International Legal 
Studies, Golden Gate University School of Law, has practiced law in Nevada for more 
than 25 years. He is a fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers and a member of 
the Nevada Trial Lawyers Association. His practice includes commercial litigation and 
business torts. He has appeared and argued before the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit and the Nevada Supreme Court in numerous reported cases. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
After Pan American Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, 
Scotland on December 21, 1988, with the death of 259 
passengers and crew as well as eleven persons on the ground, 
fixing the blame became the subject of endless speculation and 
debate in the western media. One of the usual suspects, 
Ahmed Jibril, a Palestinian terrorist reputed to be operating 
out of Syria, was blamed for the crime. But as the criminal 
investigation progressed and the advanced techniques of the 
forensic sciences were put to work, the United States finally 
announced almost three years later that the·true culprits were 
two agents of Libyan Intelligence: Abdel Basset Ali lal-
Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah. Both of these 
individuals were indicted in the United States in November, 
1991. 
In any event, there resulted an immediate outcry from the 
western press that the accused be "brought to justice" before 
American and Scottish courts. In an article appearing on 
November 14, 1991 in Newsday it was reported that, 
"[A]ccording to the L.A. Times, U.S. authorities believe that the 
attack on Flight 103 was orchestrated by Abdullah Sanussi, 
Gaddhafi's brother-in-law and the head of Libyan 
intelligence."l The case against Libya was apparently 
strengthened on account of a French investigation implicating 
Libya in a 1989 French VTA bombing. The suggestion was 
made that "forensic connections" were established between the 
UTA and Pan Am bombings. Nonetheless, the article quoted 
William Webster, recently retired as FBI chief, who suggested 
that "a number of nations" were involved. He went on to note 
that, "it has been pieced together like a mosaic with sometimes 
new information changing views on the exact players and the 
manner in which they played.'>2 How this "mosaic" is reflected 
in the, indictments remains unclear, although a considerable 
1. NEWSDAY, Nov. 14, 1991, at 7. 
2. [d. 
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amount of forensic evidence was released to the press.3 The 
Economist echoed the Newsday story in an article appearing 
two days later, but suggested that the Iranians hired the 
Libyans to arrange the bombing.4 On November 25, 1991 Time 
magazine carried an article by George J. Church entitled 
"Solving the Lockerbie Case. rn; The article detailed reprisals 
that could be taken against Libya, which was implicated in 
part on the basis of the French investigation. The forensic 
evidence that was disclosed tied the bombing to Libya, based 
upon the CIA's capture of an unexploded bomb belonging to 
terrorists supported by Libyans in African Togo. In addition, 
the bomb's timing device was allegedly, " ... one of twenty 
delivered to a Libyan official in 1985 and 1986.'>6 Additional 
evidence tied an official of Libyan Airlines to one of the accused 
and detailed the placement of the bomb on an Air Malta flight 
to Frankfurt where it was transferred to Flight 103. 
While this evidence appeared more than sufficient to obtain 
indictments, considerable pressure was building in the western 
press that Libya be punished, notwithstanding the fact that the 
accused were yet to be brought to trial. George J. Church 
posed the question in the Time magazine article asking, "how 
can he [Ghaddafi] and his regime be punished?,fl 
Armed with the results of this criminal investigation and the 
forensic evidence which it produced, the U.S. and the U.K. 
demanded the extradition of the accused from Libya. Upon 
Libya's refusal, the U.S. and the U.K. took the matter to the 
United Nations Security Council. 
On January 21, 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
731.8 This Resolution "implicated" officials of the Libyan 
government in the attack against Pan American Flight 103, 
3. Douglas Frantz; Ronald J. Ostrow, Jet Probe: Real-Life Whodunit History's 
biggest terrorism investigation spanned 40 countries. Two tiny electronics fragments 
and a diary were the keys to the Pan Am Case, Los ANGELES TIMES, 11115/91, at 1. 
4. Lockerbie's Murderers, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 1991, at 51. 
5. George J. Church, Solving The Lockerbie Case, TIME, Nov. 25, 1991, at 62. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. U.N. SCOR, 3033d mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES 731 (1992). 
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"deplore[d]" the fact that the Libyan government "has not yet 
responded effectively to the above requests to cooperate fully in 
establishing responsibility for the terrorist acts referred to 
above ... " and concluded by urging the Libyan government to 
accede to the requests of the U.S. and the U.K. in cooperating 
with the prosecution of the persons charged. 
Three days earlier Libya had requested that the dispute be 
arbitrated with the U.S. and the U.K. in accordance with the 
1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.9 This request was 
rejected and on March 3, 1992 Libya sought relief in the 
International Court of Justice. Libya applied to the court for 
provisional measures against the U.S. and the U.K., including 
(a) a declaration from the court that Libya has fully complied 
with its obligations under the Montreal Convention; (b) that 
the United States has breached its legal obligations to Libya 
under Articles 5(2), 5(3), 7, 8(2), and 11 of the Montreal 
Convention; and (c) that the court declare the United States 
"immediately to cease and desist from such breaches and from 
the use of any and all force or threats against Libya, including 
the threat of force against Libya and from all violations of the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the political 
independence of Libya . . . . ,llO . Libya informed the court on 
March 3, 1992 that provisional measures needed to be taken 
promptly to preserve Libya's rights in light of the fact that "the 
United States had indicated that it might seek or impose 
economic, air and other sanctions against Libya if Libya did not 
comply with the demands of the United States, and that the 
latter had refused to rule out the use of armed force against 
Libya ... ,>11 Finally, Libya argued "that only by granting 
provisional measures enjoining the United States from taking 
such actions against Libya was it possible to prevent Libya's 
9. Montreal Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against The Safety 
of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971,24 U.S.T. § 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570. 
10. International Court of Justice: Order With Regard To Request For the 
Indication of Provisional Measure In The Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation 
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From The Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libya v. United States), Apr. 14, 1992, 311.L.M. 662, 667. 
11. [d. 
4
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rights from being irreparably prejudiced either in fact or in 
law ... ,,12 
By letter dated March 6, 1992 the United States responded to 
the court by stating that: 
... taking into account both the absence of any 
concrete showing of urgency relating to the 
request and developments in the ongoing action 
by the Security Council and the Secretary 
General in this matter. . . the action requested 
by Libya . . . is unnecessary and could be 
misconstrued.13 
On April 14, 1992 the court voted 11 to 5 against indicating 
provisional measures. As it will be shown, of considerable 
significance in reaching this decision was the impact of 
Security Council Resolution 748 which was adopted on March 
31, 1992, barely two weeks before the court's decision.14 The 
Security Council announced its deep concern that the Libyan 
government had not effectively responded to Resolution 731 
and announced its determination: 
... in this context that the failure by the Libyan 
government to demonstrate, by concrete actions, 
its renunciation of terrorism, and in particular 
its continued failure to respond fully and 
effectively to the requests and Resolution 731 
(1992), constitute a threat to international 
peace and security ... 
Purporting to act under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations, the Security Council demanded (1) Libya's 
immediate compliance with Resolution 731; (2) that the Libyan 
government commit itself to cease from all forms of terrorist 
action and assistance to terrorist groups; and (3) enjoined "all 
states ... [to] ... adopt the measures set out below which shall 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 668. 
14. U.N. SCOR, 3036d mtg., U.N.Doc SIRES 748 (1992). 
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apply until the Security Council decides that the Libyan 
government has complied . . ."15 The Resolution then 
enumerated comprehensive sanctions against Libya, 
particularly with respect to the ingress and egress of aircraft 
from Libya, the supplying of aircraft or aircraft parts or 
maintenance, as well as the prohibition of arms transfers or the 
providing of military advisors to be followed by a reduction of 
Libyan diplomatic and consular staffs in each state. 
On November 11, 1993 the Security Council passed Resolution 
88316 upon Libya's failure to comply with Resolutions 731 and 
748. This time the Security Council made its position 
unmistakably clear that Libya must extradite the accused to 
the United Kingdom or the United StatesP 
On February 27, 1998, the ICJ· rendered its judgment 
concerning its jurisdiction to proceed and adjudicate the 
dispute between the parties under the Montreal Convention, 
voting 13 to 2 to proceed with the case.1S The ICJ was now on a 
direct collision course with the Security Council. 
15. Presumably, Libya's failure to surrender the accused is now the basis for the 
imposition ofthese sanctions. [d. 
16. U.N. SCOR, 3312tb mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES 883 (1993). 
17. Paragraph 16 provides: " ... Expresses its readiness to review the measures set 
forth above and in resolution 748 (1992) with a view to suspending them immediately if 
the Secretary-General reports to the Council that the Libyan Government has ensured 
the appearance of those charged with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 for trial before 
the appropriate United Kingdom or United States court and has satisfied the French 
judicial authorities with respect to the bombing of [Union de Transports Aeriens flight) 
772, and with a view to lifting them immediately when Libya complies fully with the 
requests and decisions in resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992); and requests the 
Secretary-General, within ninety days of such suspension, to report to the Council on 
Libya's compliance with the remaining provisions of its resolutions 731(1992) and 
748(1992») and, in the case of non-compliance, expresses its resolve to terminate 
immediately the suspension of these measures .... " [d. 
18. International Court of Justice: Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation 
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States), February 27, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 
587,609. 
6
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 5 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol5/iss1/10
1999] THE LOCKERBIE CONTROVERSY 
II. THE INITIAL REQUEST BY LIBYA FOR THE 
INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL REMEDIES 
265 
The presumption of innocence is a fundamental tenet of Anglo-
American law, deeply rooted in our judicial heritage. An 
indictment does not constitute evidence of guilt, at least in U.S. 
criminal jurisprudence. Every accused enters the court an 
innocent man, however compelling the evidence against him. 
Every American jury is so instructed by the court prior to 
retiring for its deliberations. The maxim in dubio pro reo is 
fundamental to certain civil law systems as well. 
It should come as no surprise that Libya would seek 
provisional remedies in this case. The last time the Libyans 
found themselves in a dispute with the United States, the case 
involved the bombing of a nightclub in Berlin that was 
frequented by American servicemen. Libya suffered a 
humiliating bombing raid on her capital city, military 
installations and airports. The legality of that raid will not be 
discussed here; suffice it to say that it certainly would provide 
an impetus to Libya to preempt such action by resort to the 
ICJ. 
The ICJ first noted that the Application by the Socialist 
Peoples Libyan-Arab Jamahiriya had been instituted on March 
3, 1992 "in respect of Oa dispute ... between Libya and the 
United States over the interpretation of application of the 
Montreal Convention' of September 23, 1971, a dispute arising 
from acts resulting in the aerial incident that occurred over 
Lockerbie, Scotland on 21 December, 1988 ... " The court 
found that the Application should be denied, but without 
prejudice to the exercise of jurisdiction over the underlying 
dispute.19 
19. International Court of Justice: Order With Regard To Request For the 
Indication of Provisional Measure In The Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation 
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From The Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libya v. United States), Apr. 14, 1992,31 LL.M. 662, 665-666. 
7
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In its submission to the court, Libya emphasized that it was 
not a party to any extradition treaty with the U.S. and the U.K. 
and that no basis existed for the extradition of the accused 
under Article 8, Paragraph 2 of the Montreal Convention.20 In 
requesting provisional measures, Libya asked the ICJ to 
declare that the Montreal Convention should govern the 
manner of resolving the dispute, and that resort to other 
measures should be precluded. In support of this argument, 
Libya pointed out that the U.S. and the U.K. had rebuffed 
efforts to resolve this dispute by resort to the procedures 
outlined in the Montreal Convention.21 Libya's ultimate 
objective was to enjoin the U.S. and the U.K. from compelling 
Libya to surrender the accused individuals or suffer the 
imposition of sanctions. 
III. THE PROSPECT OF CONFLICTING JURISDICTION 
BETWEEN THE ICJ AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
A. THE DILEMMA FACED BY THE ICJ IN CONSIDERATION OF 
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES 
There appears to be general agreement among commentators 
that concurrent jurisdiction exists between the Security 
Council and the ICJ in disputes such as thiS.22 Article 35(1) of 
the United Nations Charter is the authority by which a 
member state may petition· the Security Council in respect to 
"any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in 
Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council ... " Article 
34 of the U.N. Charter permits the Security Council to 
"investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to 
international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to 
20. Id. at 666-667. Article 8, Paragraph 2 of the Montreal Convention provides: 
''Article B.2. If a contracting State which makes extradition conditional on the 
existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Contracting State 
with which it has no extradition treaty, it may at its option consider this Convention as 
the legal basis for extradition in respect of the offences. Extradition shall be subject to 
the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State." 
21. Id. at 668-669. 
22. See Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Relationship Between the International Court 
of Justice and the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case, 80 AM. J. INTL'L. 
L. 643 (1994). 
8
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determine whether the continuance of the dispute or the 
situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international 
peace and security." A reasonable belief by one state that 
another is responsible for detonating a bomb on one of its 
airliners certainly qualifies as a dispute likely to lead to 
international friction. 
On the other hand, Article 38 of the statute of the International 
Court of Justice confers upon it jurisdiction to "decide in 
accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it ... " Subsection A of the statute specifically 
provides that it apply international law to those disputes 
affecting "international conventions, whether general or 
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the 
contesting states . .." Similarly, Article 36 of the statute 
expressly confers jurisdiction upon the court "in all legal 
disputes concerning ... the interpretation of a treaty ... " The 
treaty to be interpreted here is the Montreal Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation. 23 Article 14(1) of the treaty specifically confers 
jurisdiction upon the ICJ to adjudicate any dispute between 
two or more contracting parties, upon the failure of arbitration, 
at the request of anyone of those parties. 
The aerial incident occurred on December 21, 1988. The 
application for measures to be taken by the Security Council 
was not made until January 1992. The Security Council acted 
with remarkable alacrity, especially considering the 
remoteness of the incident to the indictment of the accused. 
The quality of the evidence submitted to the Security Council 
during the three days of hearings before it is beyond the scope 
of this article; one wonders however, whether it would have 
been sufficient in a United States court to convict the accused. 
As noted above, the indictment is not admissible as evidence of 
guilt. Based upon the record before the court, it is not 
surprising that it chose the prudent course of avoiding a direct 
collision with the Security Council on the question of 
23. [d. See also 24 U.S.T. § 565. 
9
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provisional remedies without, however, abstaining from 
exercising jurisdiction over the dispute. 
B. JURIDICAL BASIS FOR THE DENIAL OF PROVISIONAL REMEDIES 
The application for provisional remedies was not unlike that 
which is made by a party seeking injunctive relief in an 
American court. The applicant must demonstrate there is 
lacking a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of law and that injunctive relief is necessary to avoid 
irreparable harm and injury. Some of this equitable 
jurisprudence is evident from the arguments made by the 
parties. In this respect the juridical basis for denying 
provisional remedies is reasonable especially since the court 
did not foreclose the right of the parties to bring their disputes 
before the court according to the terms of the Montreal 
Convention. In this respect the Convention could provide an 
adequate remedy in the ordinaryeourse oflaw. 
The rush to adopt Security Council Resolution 748 on March 
31, 1992 undoubtedly was designed to preempt the court from 
granting Libya's application for provisional remedies which 
had been pending since March 3rd. The Security Council 
betrayed its true motivation when it pressured Libya at a time 
when Libya was seeking the aid of the court. Perhaps the 
intention was to pressure the court as well. 
Judge Shahabuddeen recognized the difficult position in which 
the court was placed by Resolution 748 when he observed in his 
separate opinion supporting the denial of provisional remedies: 
The question now raised by Libya's challenge to 
the validity of Resolution 748 (1992) is whether 
a decision of the Security Council may override 
the legal rights of states, and, if so, whether 
there are any limitations of the power of the 
Council to characterize a situation. as one 
justifying the making of a decision entailing 
such consequences. Are there any limits to the 
Council's powers of appreciation? In the 
equilibrium of forces underpinning the 
10
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structure of the United Nations within the 
evolving international order, is there any 
conceivable point beyond which a legal issue 
may properly arise as to the competence of the 
Security Council to produce such overriding 
results? If there are any limits, what are those 
limits and what body, if other than the Security 
Council, is competent to say what those limits 
are? If the answers to these delicate and 
complex questions are all in the negative, the 
position is potentially curious. It would not, on 
that account, be necessarily unsustainable in 
law; and how far the court can enter the field is 
another matter. The issues are however 
important, even though they cannot be 
examined now." (Emphasis Added.l4 
269 
Judge Shahabuddeen had earlier pointed out in his OpInIOn 
that an important ground for denying the provisional remedies 
to Libya was the fact that while sanctions were to be 
implemented through Resolution 748, the use of force was not. 
Because of the fact that the United States sought those 
sanctions, it could not legitimately resort to force without 
permission of the Security Council and on this basis Judge 
Shahabuddeen wrote "[s]o on this point the Resolution of the 
Security Council stands in the way, both on the law and on the 
facts.,,25 
This attitude is reflected in the order itself in which the court 
found that, "in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, the 
obligations of the parties in that respect prevail over their 
obligations under any other international agreement, including 
the Montreal Convention ... "26 On that basis, the court found: 
24. International Court of Justice: Order With Regard To Request For the 
Indication of Provisional Measure In The Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation 
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From The Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libya v. United States), Apr. 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 662, 679. 
25. [d. 
26. [d. at 671. Article 103 of the United Nations Charter provides: 
11
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... in order to pronounce on the present request 
for provisional measures, the court is not called 
upon to determine any of the other questions 
which have been raised before it in the present 
proceedings, including the question of its 
jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the case; 
and . . . the decision given in these proceedings 
in no way prejudices any such questions ... 27 
In other words, the court left all of its options open. 
C. THE JURIDICAL BASIS FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF PROVISIONAL 
REMEDIES 
In an eloquent dissenting opinion, Judge Bedjaoui brought into 
clear focus the need for recognizing the differing roles of the 
Security Council and the ICJ. He observed that here, while 
two separate organs of the United Nations are exercising 
jurisdiction over the same controversy, the Security Council is 
exercising essentially a political function while the court must 
exercise a judicial function.28 As long as the court has 
jurisdiction over a controversy, it can and should do so without 
concern of the political consequences which implicate Security 
Council resolutions. While this may be a fine distinction, it is 
worth making; as Judge Bedjaoui observed, there are really 
two disputes between the parties: 
... the fIrst dispute concerns the extradition of 
two Libyan nationals and is being dealt with, 
legally, by the court at the request of Libya, 
whereas the second dispute concerns, more 
generally, state terrorism as well as the 
international responsibility of the Libyan state 
and is being dealt with politically, by the 
"In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.· 
27. [d. 
28. [d. at 680. 
12
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Security Council, at the request of the United 
Kingdom and the United States.'>29 
271 
Bedjaoui reasoned that provisional remedies were appropriate 
to preserve the status quo until the court could rule on the legal 
question while at the same time the Security Council was free 
to consider the political aspects of the ". . . demand of 
compensation for the families of the victims and the imposition 
of an obligation concretely to renounce terrorism .. .'~o 
But where the dissent takes issue with the majority, " ... lies in 
the fact that the Security Council not only has decided to take a 
number of political measures against Libya, but has also 
demanded from it the extradition of its two nationals.'Cl 
Bedjaoui characterized this as an "overlap" with respect to the 
Security Council encroaching on the legal authority of the court 
to decide what is purely a legal matter "on the basis of the 1971 
Montreal Convention and international law in general.'~2 
Judge Bedjaoui recognized that Article 41 of the statute of the 
ICJ confers jurisdiction upon the court to render the 
provisional remedies requested and that the court was also 
obligated to ". . . grant every procedural safeguard to the 
alleged perpetrators and to protect them from the hasty 
judgments of public opinion or the mass media ... ~3 At issue 
was Libya's sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as the 
right under United Nations Charter and international law to 
be free from the threat or use of force. 
Those dissenting judges supporting the application for 
provisional remedies generally believed that the court should 
have exercised its authority to prevail upon the parties to avoid 
29. Id. emphasis added. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 681. 
33. Id. at 682. 
13
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the use of force because of the inevitable aggravation of the 
dispute which would otherwise result.34 
IV. ASSUMPTION BY THE ICJ OF JURISDICTION TO 
HEAR THE MERITS OF THE CONTROVERSY 
A. THE ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF ASSUMING JURISDICTION 
On February 27, 1998, the ICJ entered its judgment over the 
preliminary objections of the U.S. and the U.K. and assumed 
jurisdiction of this controversy. The vote was 13 to 2 with 
President Schwebel and Judge Oda dissenting.35 
The principal focus of the judgment is the applicability of the 
Montreal Convention which binds all of the parties before the 
court and which specifically provides for ICJ jurisdiction to 
resolve disputes under the treaty.36 The arbitration provisions 
contained in the treaty were important to the court in 
assuming jurisdiction over this dispute. As the court pointed 
out in Paragraph 20 of the judgment: 
Consequently, in the opinion of the court the 
alleged dispute between the parties could not be 
settled by negotiation or submitted to 
arbitration under the Montreal Convention, and 
the refusal of Respondent to enter into 
arbitration to resolve that dispute absolved 
Libya from any obligation under Article 14, 
34. [d. at 669 (dissenting opinion by Judge Ajibola) and at 707 (dissenting opinion 
of Judge El-Kosheri). 
35. International Court of Justice: Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation 
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), February 27, 1998, 
37I.L.M. 587, 618, 63l. 
36. Article 14.1 of the Montreal Convention provides: 
"Any dispute between two or more Contracting States concerning the interpretation 
or application of this Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation, shall, at 
the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the 
date of the request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organization 
of the arbitration, anyone of those Parties may refer the dispute to the International 
Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court." 24 U.S.T. § 
564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 10 l.L.M. 1151 (1971). 
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paragraph 1 of the Convention to observe a six-
month period starting from the request for 
arbitration, before seising the court.37 
273 
Of concern to the court was whether, as a matter of law, there 
existed a dispute over which it could exercise jurisdiction. 
Quoting from the judgment of June 30, 1995 In the Case 
Concerning East Timor (Portugal u. Australia): 
In order to establish the existence of dispute, "it 
must be shown that the claim of one party is 
positively opposed by the other." (Southwest 
Africa, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 1962, page 328); and further "(w]hether 
there exists an international dispute is a matter 
for objective determination" (Interpretations of 
Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, ICJ 
Reports 1950, page 74). (lCJ Reports 1995, page 
100).38 
Only the Montreal Convention could provide the framework for 
the resolution of this dispute.39 As a sovereign state, Libya 
enjoys the right under international law and the Montreal 
Convention to exercise jurisdiction over the two alleged 
37. International Court of Justice: Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation 
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), February 27, 1998, 
37 I.L.M. 587, 598. 
3B. [d. 
39. In paragraph 22 of the judgment, the court listed the following reasons why 
the Montreal Convention governed the rights of the parties: 
(a) the Respondent and Libya are bound by the Montreal Convention which is in 
force between the Parties; 
(b) the Montreal Convention is specifically aimed at preventing that type of action 
(third paragraph of the Preamble); 
(c) the actions ascribed to the Libyan nationals are covered by Article 1 of the 
Montreal Convention; 
(d) the system of the Montreal Convention, as compared to the system of the 
Charter, is both a lex posterior and a lex specialis; [consequently,] for matters covered 
by that Convention, it must a priori take precedence over the systems for which the 
Charter provides; and 
(e) there is no other convention concerning international criminal law in force which 
is applicable to these issues in the relations between Libya and the United States. 
15
Zubel: The Lockerbie Controversy
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
274 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. 5:1 
offenders, on the basis of the Libyan Penal Code, free of any 
interference from the U.S. or the U.K.40 
A more difficult and somewhat murky aspect of the judgment is 
found in a discussion under Paragraphs 48 and 49 in which the 
court attempts to dispose of the request of the United States 
that the court determine that it has no grounds for proceeding 
to judgment on the merits in light of the fact that the Security 
Council-Resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) have rendered 
Libya's claims· moot.41 The court found that to do so would 
require the parties to fully plead the merits which would result 
in "an unnecessary prolongation of an expensive and time-
consuming procedure.'>42 The court did not feel that the 
alternative, i.e. resolving the matter at the preliminary stage, 
was viable under the circumstances of this case given the fact 
that a decision on the merits was implicated in the process of 
resolving preliminary objections to jurisdiction and mootness. 
As the judgment states in paragraph 49: 
The court therefore has no doubt that Libya's 
rights on the merits would not only be affected 
by a decision not to proceed to judgment on the 
merits, at this stage in the proceedings, but 
would constitute, in many respects, the very 
subject matter of that decision. The objection 
raised by the United States on that point has 
the character of a defense on the merits. In the 
view of the Court, this objection does much 
more than "touch(ing) upon subjects belonging 
40. [d. at 600. 
41. Resolution 883 (1993) imposed additional sanctions upon Libya. These 
consisted of urging all states in which funds or fmancial resources of Libya were in 
their possession to freeze such assets; severe travel restrictions with respect to 
nationals of other states wishing to travel to Libya, close all Libyan Arab Airline offices 
within their territories; seize any commercial transactions with Libyan Airlines; 
prohibit the training of Libyan pilots; etc. Notably exempt from the sanctions were 
petroleum or petroleum products, including natural gas and natural gas products 
originating in Libya. [d. at 606 and see also SIRES 883(1993), supra note 15, at 1-6f. 
42. International Court of Justice: Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation 
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), February 27, 1998, 
37 I.L.M. 587, 607. 
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to the merits of the case 
added. Citations omitted.) 
(Emphasis 
275 
One is left with the impression that the court felt itself being 
led into a procedural trap by the United States the result of 
which would have either resulted in a summary dismissal of 
the case or an ad hoc decision on the merits in the course of 
disposing of preliminary objections. 
B. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION 
The respondents succeeded in persuading only three judges of 
the correctness of their positions, those being President 
Schwebel, Judge Oda, and Judge Sir Robert Jennings.44 On the 
question of jurisdiction, President Schwebel stated that no real 
dispute existed between the parties according to the provisions 
of the Montreal Convention principally because the United 
States, as a victim, had not invoked its provisions and by 
declining to do so had avoided creating a dispute between the 
parties which could be subject to the Convention. Because 
Libya itself as a state was accused of having procured the 
destruction of the aircraft (as opposed to those circumstances 
which are envisioned as purely terrorist acts by individuals 
over whom states may exercise criminal jurisdiction) the 
Convention could have no application. President Schwebel 
suggested "the Convention would hardly have deterrent effect 
if the state accused of having directed the sabotage were the 
only state competent to prosecute the persons accused of the 
act." He went on to note that "[a]t the same time, Article 1 of 
the Convention capaciously provides that DAny person' 
commits an offense under the Convention if he performs an act 
43. Id. at 607. 
44. Judge Jennings sat as a member of the court in the companion case in which 
Libya named the U.K as a respondent. See International Court of Justice: Case 
Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal 
Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. 
U.K) (visited January 23, 1999) <http://www.icj-cij.org/idockeUllukliluk2frame.htm> 
(Sir Robert Jennings, J., dissenting). 
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thereafter listed. Moreover, Libya has not accepted that the 
accused were agents of its Government.'>45 
President Schwebel believed that Libya's failure to obtain a 
judgment on the merits from the court prior to the adoption of 
Security Council Resolutions 748 and 883 necessarily means 
that the Resolutions "are binding and govern the Montreal 
Convention by virtue of Article 103 of the Charter.'>i6 For the 
court to assume jurisdiction over this dispute would require it 
to assume authority to "overturn the Council's determination 
under Chapter VII of the existence of a threat to the peace and 
its choice of measures to deal with the threat.'>47 Accordingly, 
because the Security Council has acted and the issues between 
the parties have been determined, there is nothing for the court 
to decide except to acknowledge its responsibility to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council. 
Writing a dissenting opinion in the companion case in which 
the United Kingdom is the named respondent, Judge Sir 
Robert Jennings also argued that the court lacked jurisdiction 
over this controversy. Judge Jennings questioned the 
applicability of the Montreal Convention to the dispute, 
observing that, "[t]he citation of the Convention as a whole also 
invites speculation as to whether it was ever intended to deal 
with acts of terrorism allegedly committed by persons actually 
employed by a government also allegedly involved in the 
commission of those acts.'!48 Because Libya has chosen neither 
to extradite the suspects nor try them by exercising Libyan 
criminal jurisdiction, he reasoned that the Montreal 
Convention has no application to the controversy and the 
parties are subject only to the provisions of the United Nations 
Charter as implemented by the Security Council. In other 
45. International Court of Justice: Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation 
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), February 27, 1998, 
37 I.L.M. 587, 619 (Schwebel, J., dissenting). 
46. [d. at 621. 
47. [d. quoting from the language of Article 25. 
48. International Court of Justice: Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation 
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.K) (visited January 23, 1999) <http://www.icj-
cij.org/idocketJilukJiluk2frame.htm> (Sir Robert Jennings, J., dissenting). 
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words, Libya could have avoided the necessity of applying to 
the court for provisional measures if Libya had simply chosen 
to prosecute the suspects in Libyan custody. 
On the subject of extradition, Judge Oda suggested that, "[t]he 
rule of non-extradition of political criminals has long prevailed 
but that rule does not apply in the case of some universal 
crimes such as genocide and acts of terrorism."49 Judge Oda 
then observed that under the Montreal Convention Libya could 
assume the responsibility to prosecute the accused if they were 
not to be extradited and whether Libya chooses to do so or 
extradite them to a "politically neutral" state does not create an 
issue within the Montreal Convention. Judge Oda made the 
rather remarkable observation that no legal dispute existed 
between Libya and the u.S. which was covered by the Montreal 
Convention. This is based upon the premise that under the 
Montreal Convention, in the absence of extradition, the state 
where the accused is located is obligated to commence 
prosecution. The decision to prosecute itself is an exercise of 
sovereignty or, as Judge Oda put it, " ... respective policies 
towards criminal justice ... " which do not " ... fall within the 
ambit of the Montreal Convention.'fjO Applying this reasoning, 
Judge Oda concluded that no dispute existed between the 
parties under the Convention and that no grounds could exist 
for the court to exercise jurisdiction to hear this case. 
Despite the cleverness of the arguments of the dissenting 
judges against the assumption of jurisdiction, the plain 
language of Article 14 places jurisdiction of this dispute 
squarely with the ICJ. 
49. International Court of Justice: Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation 
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), February 27, 1998, 
37 l.L.M. 587, 635. 
50. [d. at 635. 
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v. THE PROSPECT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SECURITY 
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS BY THE ICJ 
There has been a tremendous temptation among American 
commentators to draw analogies between the "judicial review" 
of Security Council resolutions by the ICJ with the power 
which John Marshall assumed for the United States Supreme 
Court in Marbury v. Madison,51 which established the power of 
the federal judiciary to review the constitutionality of acts of 
the legislative and executive branches.52 
But there are important distinctions to be made between the 
constitutional relationship between these three distinct 
branches of government and the relationship that exists 
between the Security Council, the General Assembly and the 
International Court of Justice under the U.N. Charter. While 
it is true that the United States Supreme Court has frequently 
abstained from exercising jurisdiction over controversies which 
it considers to be "political questions," it nonetheless possesses 
significant power arising directly from the Constitution to 
support the exercise of judicial review. The political question 
doctrine was succinctly defined by Justice Stevens where he 
wrote:53 
When a court concludes that an issue presents a 
non justiciable political question, it declines to 
address the merits of that issue. In invoking 
the political question doctrine, a court 
acknowledges the possibility that a 
constitutional provision may not be judicially 
enforceable. Such a decision is of course very 
different from determining that specific 
congressional action does not violate the 
Constitution. That determination is a decision 
51. 5 u.s. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
52. See e.g., Robert F. Kennedy, Libya v. United States: The International Court of 
Justice and the Power of Judicial Review, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 899 (1993) and see also, 
Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 22, at 643. 
53. United States Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992). 
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on the merits that reflects the exercise of 
judicial review, rather than the abstention from 
judicial review that would be appropriate in the 
case of a true political question.54 (Citations 
Omitted) 
279 
The political question doctrine came before the United States 
Supreme Court the following year in Nixon v. United States. 55 
In that case, Walter L. Nixon, a United States District Judge, 
impeached by the Senate, objected to the fact that he was not 
tried by the full Senate but rather a committee of senators 
guided by "managers." The court reasoned that the 
Constitution does not contemplate judicial review of Senate 
procedures in impeachment matters which are exclusive to that 
body. The court contrasted the impeachment process with 
specific references in the Constitution to the availability of 
judicial review of certain acts of Congress having to do with 
bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. 
M.C.W. Pinto made the observation56 that in contrast, the U.N. 
Charter grants no specific authority to the ICJ to review the 
legality of Acts of the Security Council or General Assembly 
and as such there is no grant of "constitutional" authority for 
the court to act. 
However, not all would agree that the Court may, in the 
absence of specific textual authorization from the Charter, 
make a determination of the legality of Security Council 
actions. In that connection, it is often recalled that the Belgian 
proposal at the San Francisco Peace Conference to confer on 
the court a general power to resolve disputes concerning 
interpretation of the Charter could not be adopted.57 (Citations 
Omitted). 
54. [d. at 457-458. 
55. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
56. M.C.W. PINTo, Pre-Eminence of the International Court of Justice, INCREASING 
THE EFFECTNENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 280 (C. Peck and R.S. 
Lee, Eds., 1997). 
57. Id. at page 301. 
21
Zubel: The Lockerbie Controversy
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
280 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. 5:1 
Nonetheless, Pinto and other commentators have observed that 
the court does have the power to render advisory opinions and 
has done so in connection with other important cases.58 
Advisory opinions may be requested by Article 96 of the U.N. 
Charter which specifically grants the power to the General 
. Assembly or the Security Council· to request an advisory 
opinion of the court on any legal question.59 
The question is presented differently in those situations where 
an active dispute exists between states and an advisory opinion 
is requested by one of them. This occurred in the Western 
Sahara Cases. But in those cases the legality of Security 
Council resolutions was not at issue, only ongoing disputes 
between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania. 
In the Namibia Case, the ICJ had occasion to consider its 
powers of judicial review with respect to the contention by the 
governments of France and South Africa that General 
Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI) was ultra vires. The court 
made the following observation in Paragraph 89 of its 
judgment: 
Undoubtedly, the Court does not possess powers 
of judicial review or appeal in respect of the 
decisions taken by the United Nations organs 
concerned. The question of the validity or 
conformity with the Charter on General 
Assembly 2145 (XXI) or of related Security 
Council resolutions does not form the subject of 
the request for [an] advisory opinion. However, 
in the exercise of its judicial function and since 
objections have been advanced the Court, in the 
course of its reasoning, will consider these 
58. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa 
in Namibia (S.W. Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 
16 (Jun. 21) and see also, ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 
(Oct. 16}. 
59. By way of contrast, the United States Supreme Court will never render an 
advisory opinion; in the absence of an actual case or controversy before the court, a 
party lacks standing to seek any relief. 
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objections before determining any legal 
consequences arising from those resolutions.GO 
281 
When Judge Weeramantry wrote his dissenting opinion after 
the court's denial of Libya's application for provisional 
remedies on April 14, 1992, he provided a detailed historical 
and legal analysis of the propriety of ICJ judicial review of a 
Security Council resolution.G1 While recognizing that the ICJ 
cannot function as an appellate court within the framework of 
the United Nations system, it must nonetheless recognize its 
role as " ... the principle judicial organ of the United Nations 
charged with the task, inter alia, of deciding in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it .. .'>62 As 
such, ". . . the court acts as guardian of the Charter and of 
international law for in the international arena, there is no 
higher body charged with judicial functions and with the 
determination of questions of interpretation and application of 
international law.'>63 Judge Weeramantry astutely observed 
that even in issues involving the maintenance of international 
peace and security, " ... the Charter confers no exclusive 
competence on anyone principal organ. >l64 
This view is in contrast to that espoused by Judge Sir Robert 
Jennings. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Jennings observed 
that the Court is obliged "to act always as the principal judicial 
organ of the United Nations.'>65 In so doing, it must simply 
apply applicable United Nations law. However, once the 
Security Council, exercising its discretion under Article 39 of 
the Charter determines that there exists a "threat to the 
60. 1971 LC.J. 16 supra note 58 (advisory opinion). 
61. International Court of Justice: Order With Regard To Request For the 
Indication of Provisional Measure In The Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation 
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From The Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libya v. United States), Apr. 14, 1992, 31 LL.M. 662, 668-699. 
62. [d. at 691. 
63. [d. at 691. (Emphasis added). 
64. [d. at 691. (Emphasis added). 
65. International Court of Justice: Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation 
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) (visited January 23, 1999) 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/idocketJilukiiluk2frame.htm> (Sir Robert Jennings, J., 
dissenting). 
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peace," the court has no business substituting its judgment for 
that of the Security Council. In his consideration of the 
Namibia Case, Judge Jennings.wrote: 
That there is no power of judicial review of 
Security Council decisions under Chapter VII of 
the Charter is not merely because of the dictum 
of the Court in the Namibia case. The position 
is established by the provisions of the Charter 
itself. Moreover it is evident from the records of 
San Francisco that a power of judicial review 
was proposed and rejected by the drafting 
conference. The Court is not a revising body, it 
may not substitute its own discretion for that of 
the Security Council; nor would it in my view be 
a suitable body for doing that; nor is the 
forensic adversarial system suited to the 
making of political decisions.66 
What is unique about the Lockerbie case is that the court is 
presented with a treaty violation under the Montreal 
Convention which in a sense has been "pre-judged" by the 
Security Council in Resolutions 731, 748 and 883 with 
particular reference to the demand that Libya surrender the 
accused to the United Kingdom or the United States for trial. 
If the court should adjudicate the liability of the parties 
according to the treaty, Libya's failure to bring the accused to 
trial within its own jurisdiction, absent an extradition treaty 
with the requesting states, can be construed as a violation of 
Article 7 of the treaty, which provides that in the absence of 
extradition that the case be submitted to the competent 
authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Article 7 also 
provides that, "[t]hose authorities shall take their decision in 
the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offense of a 
serious nature under the law of that state.'>67 Unquestionably, 
Libya has failed to do this arguing that the United States has 
66. 1d. 
67. 24 U.s.T. § 571. 
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not cooperated under the treaty by providing the necessary 
evidence to support the prosecution of the accused. These 
questions undoubtedly will have to be resolved by the Court. 
A larger question emerges with respect to the issue of 
sanctions. If the court is persuaded to address the propriety of 
sanctions under the Security Council resolutions after deciding 
culpability under the treaty, the issue of judicial review will 
have to be faced. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Finding a path through this legal labyrinth is not easy. 
Unquestionably, the court had little choice but to accept 
jurisdiction of this treaty dispute upon Libya's Application. 
But it has not been asked for an advisory opinion and, instead, 
must settle an active dispute. Under Article 14 (1) of the 
Convention, it must adjudicate this dispute in conformity with 
Article 38 of the statute of the court. There is nothing in 
Article 38 which requires the court to accord any special legal 
effect to a resolution of the Security Council,except to the 
extent that a Security Council resolution is presumptively valid 
under the U.N. Charter. The ICJ may have to decide the 
question on the basis of the evidence presented and at the end 
of the day it will have to conclude whether the sanctions which 
have been imposed by the Security Council on Libya are 
justified. 
One can envision the following scenarios: 
(1) The court affirms Libya's right under the Montreal 
Convention to decline extradition of the accused while 
at the same time fmding that Libya has violated Article 
7 of the treaty by failing to "submit the case to its 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution." 
The court may not be persuaded that Libya needs 
evidence from the United States to justify going forward 
with the prosecutions and Libya could be held to have 
violated this provision of the treaty. The sanctions 
could therefore be justified, to be followed by the 
25
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possibility of additional sanctions to include, for 
example, export restrictions on petroleum products. 
(2) The court finds that the United States has acted in 
bad faith by refusing to supply the necessary evidence to 
justify prosecution of the accused, in which event Libya 
could be found justified in failing to bring the accused to 
trial in Libya. In that case, the justification for the 
sanctions would be called into question and 
international support for Resolutions 731, 748 and 883 
would be undermined. 
(3) An agreement is reached permitting the trial of the 
accused in the Netherlands under Scottish law. If this 
results in the lifting of sanctions, this should bring the 
matter to an end leaving the court with nothing to 
decide. 
In short, a political solution to this dispute may well resolve 
the matter without the need for further proceedings before the 
court.68 But a precedent has already been set. In the future, on 
the basis of the lengthy opinions which have been written by 
these eminent jurists, there now exists considerable authority 
for a state, wishing to challenge the legality of a Security 
Council resolution, to point to the Lockerbie cases as a basis for 
the ICJ to become involved in an international political dispute 
which has already precipitated action by the Security Council. 
The court could be persuaded to exercise its jurisdiction over a 
68. In December, 1998, Secretary General Kofi Annan visited Libya in an effort to 
secure the surrender of the two suspects for trial in the Netherlands. On December 16, 
1998, it was reported in the Straits Times, that shortly after he spoke to the Libyan 
. General Peoples Congress, a spokesman for that country's top legislative body reported 
that it was satisfied with a plan to try the suspects in a neutral country "with all 
guarantees." On December 17, 1998, the court, on application of the United Kingdom 
granted an extension of time to March 31, 1999 for the filing of its Counter-Memorial, 
and a like order was entered on application of the United States. This followed a 
change of policy by the U.S. and the U.K. allowing the trial to be conducted in the 
Netherlands. However, the parties have yet to agree on all conditions. 
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treaty dispute which might be implicated in connection with a 
breach of the peace.69 
Whether this case will ultimately determine the contours of 
judicial review by the court of Security Council competence 
remains an open question. The very fact that the court has 
accepted jurisdiction and has chosen to adjudicate this 
controversy under the Montreal Convention will mean that 
these cases will likely serve as precedents for future 
applications by states wishing to avoid the impact of Security 
Council resolutions. 
69. Judge Jennings envisioned the possibility that in such circumstances the court 
might be asked to interfere with peacekeeping operations (supra note 65). But if the 
peacekeeping operations are being undertaken illegally, why shouldn't a state have 
recourse to the ICJ? 
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